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Abstract 
This paper investigates the links between corruption and compliance with social distancing during 
COVID-19 pandemic in America. Both theory and empirical evidence point to a corrosive effect of 
corruption on trust/social capital which in turn determine people’s behavior towards compliance 
with public health policies. Using data from 50 states we find that people who live in more corrupt 
states are less likely to comply with so called shelter in place/stay at home orders. 
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1 Introduction  
Social distancing is the main policy in the global public health and policy response to the COVID-
19 pandemic. Understanding the determinants of compliance with this policy is important as the 
virus spreads to ever more vulnerable communities which are less able to handle large numbers of 
critically ill patients. Many of these communities lack not only the physical and social infrastructure 
needed to fight the COVID-19 pandemic but are also often viewed as having endemic corruption.  
Motivated by several related literatures ranging from sociology, to political science, to 
economics, this research note investigates the role of corruption in determining compliance with 
social distancing using data from 50 American states. Using a corruption measure based on 
corruption convictions and a measure of compliance based on cell phone activity constructed by 
SafeGraph, we find that states with higher corruption convictions have lower levels of compliance. 
Our findings suggest that communities in which corruption is endemic will find it difficult to 
employ effective containment and mitigation strategies based on social distancing. As such 
communities typically already suffering from poor health infrastructures and outcomes (Azfar and 
Gurgur, 2008; Friedman, 2018; Dincer and Teoman, 2019) will face this crisis with very few 
effective weapons in their arsenal. An implication of this is that additional funding will have to be 
directed towards fighting the virus. While there are valid concerns that corruption will prevent such 
funds reach the intended targets and beneficiaries (Suryadarma and Yamauchi, 2013; Briggs 2014), 
there is some evidence that aid for public health aid can be effective even in corrupt states (Dietrich, 
2011). 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we will discuss the channels 
through which corruption affects compliance with social distancing. In section 3, we describe the 
data. In section 4, we discuss the estimation method and present the results. In section 5, we 
conclude.   
2 Corruption, Social Capital, and Shelter in Place  
Starting with California in mid-March, the majority of American states instituted shelter in 
place/stay at home orders as part of their greater social distancing policies. Schools, restaurants, 
and bars were closed, and all nonessential businesses were ordered to keep workers home and let 
them work remotely.  People were asked not to leave their homes unless necessary. Penalties for 
the violators varied significantly across the states. While in some states, there were no penalties, in 
most of the states, violation of the orders was considered a misdemeanor punishable with a small 
fine, albeit never enforced. In states such as Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, 
protesters, sometimes armed with assault rifles, packed state capitols and streets violating the states’ 
orders, while in London, police arrested people protesting social distancing orders in Hyde Park. 
In other words, although it was mandated in theory, in practice, states depended heavily on 
voluntary social distancing. This resulted in a significant variation in social distancing behavior 
across the states. 
There are several variables that can plausibly explain the variation in compliance with shelter 
in place/stay at home orders across American states including corruption. Corruption affects how 
people behave through its effects on trust in government and legitimacy of government. 
Trust in government is an important determinant of social capital which is defined as a set of 
norms shared among people that allows cooperation to help solve collective action problems. Social 
capital manifests itself in communities as a reciprocal relationship between levels of civic 
participation and interpersonal trust. The more that people participate in their communities, the 
more that they trust others; the greater trust that people hold for others, the more likely they are to 
participate (Brehm and Rahn 1997 and Fukuyama 1995). Interpersonal trust depends heavily on 
trust in government (Levi 1998, Levi and Stoker 2000, Rothstein 2000, 2005). According to 
Rothstein and Eek (2009), when forming their beliefs about the other people in a community, 
people make inferences from the behavior of government officials. In other words, they simply 
form their beliefs based on the following way of thinking: ‘‘if it proves that I cannot trust the local 
policemen and judges, then whom in the society can I trust?’’ (Rothstein and Eek 2009, 90). Several 
studies in political science literature find negative effects of corruption on trust in government 
(Anderson and Tverdova, 2003, Chang and Chu, 2006, Rothstein and Eek, 2009).  Because trust in 
government and interpersonal trust are positively related, corruption affects interpersonal trust 
negatively. As Rothstein and Eek (2009) argue, 
• if government officials in a society are known to be corrupt, people will believe that they 
cannot be trusted. They will therefore think that most other people cannot be trusted; 
• if government officials in a society are known to be corrupt, people will believe that other 
people engage in corruption as well. They will therefore think that most other people cannot 
be trusted. 
Lower interpersonal trust means lower civic participation, and lower civic participation means 
lower social capital. Since social distancing can be considered as a collective action problem, we 
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expect people not to comply with the shelter in place/stay at home orders in corrupt states with low 
social capital. 
Gilson (2003) argues the production of health and health care requires cooperation within 
health systems which in turn requires trust. Several empirical studies present persuasive evidence 
regarding the effects of trust in government in particular, and social capital in general on 
compliance with public health policies. Blair et al. (2017), for example, investigate the behavior of 
Liberians during the 2014-2015 outbreak of Ebola, and they find that people with lower trust in 
government took fewer steps to protect themselves and were less likely to comply with the 
government’s social distancing orders. Vinck et al. (2019) in the context of a later outbreak in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo find similar results. They find that low trust in government explains 
lower willingness to adopt preventative behavior and accept a vaccine.1  Trust/social capital have 
been found, in some contexts, to be determinants of mental and physical health (Lochner et al. 
2003; Yip et al. 2007; Ahnquist et al. 2012). 
The second channel through which corruption affects social distancing is legitimacy of 
government. As Christensen and Laegreid (2016) argue, legitimacy affects how people behave 
toward government in crises such as the one we are experiencing today. Government legitimacy is 
defined as a force that increases compliance with the law even when the threat of punishment is 
low (Tyler 2006). Levi and Sacks (2009), using survey data from Sub-Saharan Africa, find that tax 
compliance is positively related to government legitimacy. Several experimental and empirical 
studies such as Seligson (2002) and Boly et al. (2019), find a negative relationship between 
corruption and government legitimacy, and Ali et al. (2014) find evidence that corruption weakens 
tax compliance in South Africa and Uganda. In other words, to the extent that corruption weakens 
the legitimacy of government, we expect that it will also reduce compliance with shelter in 
place/stay at home orders. 
3 Data  
Investigating the relationship between corruption and social distancing presents several challenges, 
perhaps the most important one being the measurement of people’s compliance with social 
distancing. We use the Shelter in Place Index constructed by SafeGraph. SafeGraph measures 
people’s stay at home behavior as the percentage of people staying home all day compared to a 
baseline based on population movement data representing 45 million smartphone devices. The 
index ranges from -100 to 100, where 0 indicates no change from the baseline. Baseline is defined 
as the average percentage of people staying home all day and every day across the seven days 
ending February 12, 2020. Home is defined as the most common nighttime location of the 
smartphone device in recent months identified to a precision of about 100 square meters. As an 
example, if the baseline percentage of people staying home for a state is 20, and 30 percent of the 
population is staying home on March 27th, then the index for March 27th is 10.2  Our sample covers 
four consecutive Saturdays starting from April 11. Over the last three weeks of April and the first 
week of May, shelter in place/stay at home orders were in place in all states but seven, and the 
infections peaked in a majority of the states. 
 
1
 See Yaqub et al. (2014) for a more general study covering European countries regarding the relationship between trust 
and vaccine hesitancy. 
2
 See safegraph.com for details. 
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We measure corruption using data from the Justice Department’s “Report to Congress on the 
Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section.” In response to Watergate and growing 
concerns about corruption, the Public Integrity Section was established in the Justice Department 
in 1976 to prosecute corrupt officials. This unit reports the total convictions for crimes related to 
corruption annually. The data are available starting from 1976. These data cover a broad range of 
crimes from election fraud to wire fraud. This Corruption Convictions Index (CCI) is used in 
several studies such as Glaeser and Saks (2006), Dincer (2008), and Alt and Lassen (2012) to 
measure corruption across states. To construct CCI, following Glaeser and Saks (2006) and Alt and 
Lassen (2012) we deflate the number of convictions by state population. Since the data cover 
convictions of both private individuals and public officials, deflating the number of convictions by 
population instead of the number of government employees is more appropriate. Because it takes 
time for corruption to affects people’s level of trust (both interpersonal and government) and level 
of civic participation, we use CCI averaged over the last decade in our empirical analysis.  
We also control for several economic and demographic variables in our empirical analysis to 
minimize the omitted variable bias. We first control for how generous and pro-social people in each 
state are in terms of charitable giving and volunteering. We use the State Generosity Index 
constructed by WalletHub which ranges from 0 to 100.3  Charitable giving and volunteering are the 
most relevant components of social capital in the context of this paper.4  We construct a dummy 
variable, SGI, which is equal to 1 if a state falls into the highest quartile of WalletHub’s State 
Generosity Index. Figure 1 shows how people respond to shelter in place/stay at home orders in 
five most/least charitable/corrupt states which fall into lowest quartile of generosity and highest 
quartile of corruption. Second, we control for the percentage of people tested positive for COVID-
19 in each state on four consecutive Thursdays starting from April 9 (COVID-19 Positive). The 
third control variable is the percentage of the votes that Donald Trump received in 2016 presidential 
elections (Trump). Donald Trump showed his support loudly and repeatedly over both traditional 
and social media to people protesting (and violating) the shelter in place/stay at home orders issued 
by the governors of several states.  The data are from electproject.org. The next two control 
variables are per capita personal income (Income), and unionization (Union). Social distancing is 
costlier for some than others. People living paycheck to paycheck with little to no savings may not 
comply with social distancing. Regarding unionization, the pandemic resulted in job losses across 
the country, but many union workers had various protections due to their collective bargaining 
agreements. As NBC News reports, approximately 150,000 United Auto Workers members at Ford, 
General Motors, and Fiat Chrysler lost their jobs, but continued to receive supplemental 
unemployment benefits payments from the automakers. Their contract gives members at least six 
months of extra pay on top of unemployment insurance that adds up to being 85 percent of their 
hourly wages. Our Income data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and Union data are from 
unionstats.com. Finally, we control for population density. In densely populated urban 
communities, the risk of infection is higher. The data are from the Census Bureau. All control 
variables except Trump are from last year. Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. 
 
3
 See wallethub.com for details. 
4
 Unfortunately, we are not able to control for trust in government and interpersonal trust. Two frequently used surveys, 
American National Election Study (ANES) and General Social Survey (GSS) which ask questions regarding trust, are 
both nationally representative surveys. In other words, sampling is not done at the state level. 
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4 Estimation Method and Results  
We estimate a system of four equations with seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) in which the 
dependent variables are the Shelter in Place Indices for April 11, April 18, April 25, and May 2. 
Each Saturday forms one fourth of the system. Estimating a system with SUR has several 
advantages over estimating each equation individually with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). First, 
SUR is more efficient because it allows errors to be correlated across the equations. Second, 
because each equation has the same set of independent variables, it allows us to conduct joint tests. 
The maximum likelihood estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the state level are 
presented in Table 2.5 
The estimated coefficient of CCI is negative and statistically significant in all four equations 
indicating that in corrupt states people are less likely to comply with shelter in place/stay at home 
orders. The magnitude of the effect is significant as well. Based on the estimated coefficients in 
Equation 4, a one standard deviation increase in CCI causes the Shelter in Place Index to decrease 
by approximately 10 percent. The standardized effect of COVID-19 Positive is only slightly greater 
than 10 percent. Perhaps more interestingly, the magnitude of the effect increases each week. The 
estimated coefficient of CCI in Equation 4 (Shelter in Place Index on May 2) is 2.5 times greater 
than the one in Equation 1 (Shelter in Place Index on April 11). As what many call “quarantine 
fatigue” developed, people stayed home less and less during the time period that our sample covers. 
Across all states, on average, the Shelter in Place Index decreased by 30 percent from April 11 to 
May 2. On the other hand, in states such as Mississippi, Montana, Oklahoma, and South Dakota 
which fall into the highest quartile of CCI, it decreased more than 50 percent even though the risk 
of infection was still high, and the percentage of people tested positive for COVID-19 stayed the 
same or increased. Our results show that “quarantine fatigue” makes the collective action problem 
even more difficult to solve in states in which corruption is high.  
The signs of the estimated coefficients of the control variables are also statistically significant 
and their signs are in line with our expectations. People respond to shelter in place/stay at home 
orders if more people tested positive for COVID-19. In densely populated charitable states, they 
stay at home more as well. The estimated coefficient of Trump is not only negative, but its 
magnitude is also greater than that of CCI. Based on the estimated coefficients in Equation 4, a one 
standard deviation increase in Trump reduces the Shelter in Place Index by 20 percent. Finally, in 
richer states and the states in which workers are unionized people comply with social distancing 
policies more. 
Several economic and demographic control variables which we think are relevant are omitted 
in our regressions because of multicollinearity. When we included variables controlling for income 
inequality, poverty, race, gender, and age in our regressions, their coefficients were estimated to be 
statistically insignificant with very high p values. Inclusion of these variables in the estimation did 
not change the estimated coefficient of CCI either. We do not report the results for the sake of 
brevity, but they are available on request.   
 
5
 For correlation matrix of residuals see Table 3. 
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5 Conclusion  
Studies from across the social sciences have pointed to corruption as corrosive to trust/social capital 
which are vital to compliance with public health orders. Using data from American states, we show 
that more corrupt states are likely to have lower compliance with shelter in place/stay at home 
orders.  
The findings of this paper, which we believe hold beyond America given that the mechanisms 
linking corruption to trust/social capital, and trust/social capital to public health have been found 
to hold in variety of contexts, suggest that countries with endemic corruption will find it more 
difficult to contain the virus through public health orders. Many developing countries suffer from 
poor health infrastructure and endemic corruption.  
In terms of policy, our findings and the literatures on which they are built suggest that corrupt 
countries may need the help of external, and trusted agencies to legitimize public health orders. 
Because they may find that compliance is lower than in other places, they will need additional 
resources to fight the COVID-19 crisis. 
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Figure 1. Most/Least Charitable/Corrupt States 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
  
Mean 
 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Min. 
 
Max. 
 
Shelter in Place Index     
 April 11, 2020 15.782 4.017 9.06 27.62 
 April 18, 2020 16.035 4.237 9.89 29.05 
 April 25, 2020 12.854 4.249 6.48 26.08 
 May 2, 2020 11.107 4.623 4.22 24.26 
     
COVID-19 Positive     
 April 9, 2020 0.122 0.093 0.028 0.476 
 April 16, 2020 0.126 0.094 0.026 0.496 
 April 23, 2020 0.129 0.093 0.023 0.499 
 April 30, 2020 0.124 0.088 0.019 0.479 
     
CCI 2.996 2.071 0.301 10.784 
     
SGI 0.260 0.443 0 1 
     
Trump 49.241 10.220 30.030 68.500 
     
Income 83,686 16,537 32,044 124,946 
     
Union 11.274 5.152 3.600 24.400 
     
Population Density 0.202 0.264 0.001 1.197 
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Table 2. Maximum Likelihood SUR Estimation 
Dependent Variable: Log Shelter in Place Index 
 
  
Equation 1 
April 11, 2020 
 
 
Equation 2 
April 18, 2020 
 
Equation 3 
April 25, 2020 
 
Equation 4 
May 2, 2020 
     
COVID-19 Positive 0.804 0.847 1.248 1.260 
 (0.147)*** (0.194)*** (0.184)*** (0.274)*** 
     
CCI -0.016 -0.017 -0.030 -0.043 
 (0.007)** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.012)*** 
     
SGI 0.101 0.095 0.090 0.140 
 (0.039)** (0.038)** (0.048)* (0.053)*** 
     
Trump -0.009 -0.007 -0.012 -0.018 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** 
     
Log Income 0.122 0.134 0.106 0.218 
 (0.065)* (0.068)** (0.073) (0.105)** 
     
Union 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.012 
 (0.004)** (0.003)** (0.004)** (0.006)** 
     
Population Density 0.035 0.041 0.043 0.046 
 (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.011)*** (0.012)*** 
     
Constant 1.406 1.206 1.403 0.328 
 (0.712)** (0.779) (0.853)* (1.221) 
     
Robust standard errors (clustered at the state level) in parentheses. All models control for region fixed effects. ***, **, 
and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix of Residuals 
 
 April 11 April 18 April 25 May 2 
April 11 1    
April 18 0.806 1   
April 25 0.871 0.794 1  
May 2 0.847 0.763 0.846 1 
  
